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Abstract
Mobile agents are programs that can migrate from machine
to machine in a heterogeneous, partially disconnected net-
work. As mobile agents move across a network, they con-
sume resources. We discuss a system for controlling the ac-
tivities of mobile agents that uses electronic cash, a banking
system, and a set of resource managers. We describe pro-
tocols for transactions between agents. We present fixed-
pricing and dynamic-pricing policies for resources. We fo-
cus on and analyze the sealed-bid second-price auction as a
mechanism for dynamic pricing.
1 Introduction
Mobile agents are programs that can migrate from ma-
chine to machine in a heterogeneous network. The pro-
gram chooses when and where to migrate. It can suspend
its execution at an arbitrary point, jump to another ma-
chine and resume execution on the new machine. Thus,
mobile agents co-locate data and computation by bringing
the computation to the data, rather than by bringing the
data to the computation. Agents have the necessary auton-
omy to make decisions, and to interact with other agents
and services to accomplish their goals. Our previous re-
search [RGK97, KGN+97] shows that mobile agents have
tremendous promise as a uniform paradigm for developing
distributed applications, primarily because agents are easier
to write than message- or RPC-based applications, their au-
tonomy makes them well suited to poorly connected network
environments, and they remove the need for distributed ap-
plications to have their own control language.
As mobile agents move across a network, they consume
resources. How can we prevent agents from over-utilizing
or wasting the resources on the computers they visit? This
question becomes especially important in an environment
that spans multiple administrative domains.
A realistic mobile-agent system must be able to work ef-
fectively in a heterogeneous, distributed environment. In the
course of its lifetime, a single agent may visit many different
types of machines, which run different operating systems,
and are administered by different organizations with differ-
ent policies and goals. If a mobile-agent system is to work
in such a situation, it is critical for the system architecture
to include mechanisms for controlling resource usage, and
include hooks to allow customization of the resource-control
policies. Resources include everything from CPU time to
screen space. The resource owners (i.e., the machines and
their owners) need to control the quantity of resources used
by each agent, particularly agents that are not owned by
the same user or organization. It is not sufficient for each
machine to control an agent’s local resource usage, as might
a traditional operating system; the agent’s lifetime resource
usage must also be controlled, to prevent agents from circu-
lating forever. The agents themselves need to control their
own resource usage, not only to optimize their own perfor-
mance but also to respond effectively to limits imposed on
them by the resource owners.
In this paper we present the market-based resource-
control component of our mobile-agent system called
D’Agents.1 The D’Agents system supports inter-agent eco-
nomic transactions with a system infrastructure consisting of
a currency model, a banking system, and a set of currency-
aware resource managers. This infrastructure allows (1) re-
source managers to set prices for resources and (2) agents
to dynamically adapt to the resource-pricing environment
to meet their goals within their resource constraints. We
propose to use sealed-bid, second-price auctions to enable
the resource managers to set prices dynamically in response
to changing conditions, based on a set of abstract priorities
set by their human owner. We present a lower bound for
the the wait time in a sealed-bid second-price auction and
discuss simulation experiments.
This paper is organized as follows. After a brief dis-
cussion of related work, Section 3 gives a overview of our
mobile-agent system D’Agents. Section 4 describes the cur-
rency model, the distributed banking system, the resource
managers, the protocols for transactions between agents, and
an application that uses them to support a traveling sales-
person. In Section 5 we discuss dynamic resource pricing
with auctions, analyze auctions with respect to an agent’s
waiting time to receive a service, and present simulation re-
sults from running auctions among agents. We wrap up with
a discussion in Section 6.
1Previously known as Agent Tcl.
2 Related Work
Mobile agents permit the migration of an agent (a compu-
tation) to a data source. This co-location enhances pro-
grammers’ flexibility in much the same manner as does
multi-threaded programming, by allowing software authors
another dimension to express solutions. D’Agents [Gra97,
KGN+97] and Telescript [Whi94] are examples of systems
supporting this form of migratory computation. Allowing
processes to relocate, however, reinforces the importance of
regulation. Social systems have evolved markets as simple
distributed solutions to limiting consumption and facilitat-
ing trade.
Markets not only allow resource owners to rent out their
capital for outside use, but place a limit on the lifetime of
mobile processes by tying consumption to a limited cur-
rency supply. There have been several major approaches
to setting prices in computational markets: sealed-bid auc-
tions, reservation-style resource options, and priority pric-
ing. Spawn [WHH+92] is an example of a system using
second-price sealed-bid auctions to distribute resources. In
Spawn, tasks compete for resources by submitting bids to
the resource’s owner. Bids can be expressed in a more
complex manner than a simple price in systems like WAL-
RAS [Wel96], where agents submit demand functions ex-
pressing the quantity desired at given prices. The market
then computes a clearing price for goods. Waldspurger and
Weihl [WW96] describe their allocation framework for sell-
ing shares that represent options for processor use. Holding
a share ensures that an agent will receive a fraction of proces-
sor use proportional to the number of shares in circulation.
Finally, it is possible to fix prices for multiple levels of ser-
vice quality as described in [GSW97]. Prices can periodically
be calibrated to match changing demand and encourage re-
sponsible consumption.
Markets require a mechanism to ensure reliable and le-
gitimate transactions among agents. We propose using a
trusted third party as an arbiter, though that is not the only
solution. Sandholm [SL95] proposes game-theoretical situa-
tions where trade is likely to be safe given the maximum loss
of a single transaction and the effect of defaulting on one’s
reputation. By adding a penalty for decommitting [SL96],
agents can be persuaded to act in responsible fashion, while
still having the flexibility to back out of a transaction in an
emergency.
3 D’Agents: a Mobile Agent System
D’Agents [RGK97, Gra97, KGN+97] was developed to sup-
port mobile agents written in Agent Tcl, Agent Java, and
Agent Scheme (extensions of Tcl, Java, and Scheme, respec-
tively) over the past two years. The primary goal of the
project has been to implement a computational paradigm
that co-locates data and computation by bringing the com-
putation to the data (rather than the data to the computa-
tion). D’Agents supports this paradigm with mobile agents,
which are programs that can migrate under their own con-
trol from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network.
In other words, the program can suspend its execution at
an arbitrary point, migrate to another machine, and resume
execution on the new machine. Mobile agents are especially
suited for applications on disconnected computers such as
laptops and palmtops that require filtering large amounts of
data.
D’Agents reduces migration to a single instruction, pro-
vides simple communication among agents, and runs on
generic Unix platforms. Our modified Tcl, Java, and (com-
ing soon) Scheme interpreters can capture the internal state
of an executing script (the stack, the contents of variables,
etc.) at an arbitrary point. In addition, our modified in-
terpreters provide a special set of commands that allow a
program to migrate to other machines and to communicate
with other migrating agents.
In our system, a mobile agent is simply a Tcl, Java, or
Scheme program that runs in modified interpreters and uses
the agent commands to roam through a network and interact
with other agents. The program can decide to move to a new
machine at any time. It issues the agent jump command,
which suspends script execution, captures and packages the
internal state of the script, and sends this state image to
an agent server on the destination machine (a special server
runs on every machine to which mobile agents can be sent).
The server restores the state image and the Tcl script con-
tinues execution on the new machine from the exact point
at which it left off.
Our agents can communicate via message passing, stream
connections, or remote procedure call [KGN+97]. An agent
can use the Tk toolkit to present a graphical user interface
on either its home machine or on a remote machine to which
it has migrated.
D’Agents protects individual machines from malicious
agents (as well as groups of machines that are under sin-
gle administrative control) [Gra97, Gra96].
4 Resource Control
As mobile agents move across a network, they consume re-
sources. How can we prevent agents from over-using or wast-
ing the resources on the computers they visit? We devel-
oped a system for controlling the activities of mobile agents
that uses electronic cash, a banking system, and a set of
resource managers. In the following sections we describe
the prototypes for each of these modules. These prototypes
are modularized to enable easy experimentation with differ-
ent resource managers, electronic cash models, and banking
models.
4.1 Electronic Cash
Agents carry with them a finite amount of currency, which
they pay to resource owners for the resources they use. As a
result, agents have the freedom to choose how to spend their
currency on resources. They can dynamically trade off space
and time, for example, once they have seen the relative cost
of the necessary resources, according to their own encoded
priorities. In addition, resource owners have the freedom to
choose how to price their resources. A workstation owner
that does not wish to see its CPU bogged down by outside
agents will set a high price on its CPU time.2 Another work-
station owner may find it has surplus CPU cycles, memory
pages, disk blocks, and so forth, and may choose to price
its resources more competitively. Alternatively, the resource
prices can be set dynamically using the policies described in
Section 5.
2Or, of course, it can use the security mechanisms to completely
bar remote agents.
4.2 The Banking System
We developed a distributed system of banks to manage cur-
rency using on-line protocols that allow agents to talk to
their banks while executing a transaction. Although we de-
veloped a simple protocol of our own, we plan to consider ex-
isting approaches used for Internet or smart-card commerce.
We have also addressed off-line protocols in the case where
the buyer and seller agent are willing to interact through
the mediation of a trusted third party. The off-line proto-
cols are especially important when mobile agents operate on
disconnected devices such as laptops.
The banking system functions as follows. There are a
small number of bank agents, which have the authority to
issue currency. The banks trust each other. (In a real sys-
tem, it is likely that the banks would be run by accredited
organizations and carefully regulated, much as the banks in
today’s real world.) Each bank has a well-known public key,
and a secret private key. (We use PGP for our public-key
cryptosystem.)
Every machine and application agent that needs to han-
dle currency contracts with the bank of their choice. They
need only know and trust that one bank.
In our model, all agents, machines, and resources are
ultimately owned by some person or organization. Thus, the
currency collected through the sale of resources accumulates
in the name of the resources’ owners. Those entities may
then allocate currency to agents that they wish to send out
for their own business.
All currency is kept in wallets; a wallet is a set of bills ;
each bill is a unique, cryptographically signed document is-
sued by one of the accredited banks. Each user and agent
has its own wallet. Each bill is just a few bytes of informa-
tion, indicating the name of the bank, the amount of the bill,
the unique identifying number for that bill, and the bank’s
signature. The bank’s signature is generated using its pub-
lic key, and depends on all of the other bits in the bill. The
authenticity of any bill can be quickly verified by checking
the signature.
This agent-banking system can be extended to include
human users who might interact with the agents. Each com-
puter user would have their own wallet, as would each orga-
nizational entity. If the machines are owned by the organiza-
tion, then they would accumulate currency through the sale
of their resources, and distribute currency to their personnel
to satisfy their needs.
When a user creates an agent, the user gives the agent
a few bills for its wallet. As it travels the network, the
agent must buy all of its resources, using this currency. This
includes CPU time, disk space, queries, etc. If the agent
runs out of currency, it can execute no longer. We expect
host systems will have enough charity to send the agent back
to its home machine, or at least to send a death notice to
the home machine.
4.3 Transactions Using Electronic Cash
Suppose agent A wishes to pay agent B for a resource or
service. In the simplest case, agent A has a bill in its wallet
for exactly the correct amount. It gives that bill to agent B,
that is, the bits are copied from some variable in agent A to
some variable in agent B. (If necessary, this transmission can
be encrypted with the public key of agent B to prevent other
agents from intercepting the bill.) Agent B adds the bill to
its wallet, and agent A removes the bill from its wallet.
To prevent the same bill from being used twice, agent B
should validate the bill when it is received. The following
protocol accomplishes this. Agent B sends the bill to its
bank, bank B. Bank B sends the bill to the bank that issued
the bill, Bank A. Bank A validates the authenticity of the
bill and records the fact that it has been used, so that it
cannot be used again. Bank B issues a new bill to agent B
for the same amount. Agent B is now satisfied.
If agent A does not have a combination of bills that sum
to the correct amount, it can break one of its larger bills into
smaller bills by sending the bill to bank A.
Note that neither of the banks need know or validate the
identity of the agents, only the currency.
4.4 Arbitrated Transactions
To prevent cheating, where agent B accepts the money with-
out providing the service, or where agent A uses the service
and then refuses to pay, we add a trusted third-party arbiter
to the transaction (see Figure 1). This arbiter is especially
useful when the two agents are exchanging large amounts
of currency, or have reason to mistrust each other. When
the arbiter is involved, both agents A and B are required
to send some collateral currency to the arbiter. After it re-
ceives the collateral from both agents, the arbiter notifies
both agents. The agents complete their transaction. If ei-
ther agent complains within the pre-agreed time, the arbiter
retains the other agent’s collateral. At the end of the wait-
ing period, the arbiter returns the collateral to each agent
if the other agent had not complained. It is not in the best
interest of an agent to cheat the other agent, because it loses
its collateral. It is also not in the best interest of an agent to
complain arbitrarily, since it will not gain anything, and the
other party will simply retaliate and cause the first agent to
lose its collateral also. An audit trail by the arbiter allows a
final (human) source for reconciliation of disputes.
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Figure 1: The arbiter protocol is used to prevent cheating.
Agent A requests a service from Agent B. To start the trans-
action, Agent A gives the arbiter the cost of the service plus
a given amount of e-cash collateral and Agent B gives the
arbiter that same amount of e-cash collateral. Upon success-
ful completion of the transaction, the Arbiter Agent returns
the collateral to Agent A and Agent B.
4.5 Resource Managers
In D’Agents, nearly everything can be viewed as a resource.
Some resources are closely tied to the hardware, and others
represent abstract services. Most resources come in units,
and most units involve time in some form. Example re-
sources include CPU time (cycles or cycles per second of
real time), main memory (byte-seconds), disk space (KByte-
seconds), screen space (pixel-seconds), speaker (seconds),
microphone (seconds), keyboard (seconds), network trans-
mission (byte-seconds), database access (records searched),
and so forth.
Each resource has a manager. Each resource manager
is responsible for a particular resource (or class of resource)
and fields all requests for access to that resource. Its sole
job is to determine whether access should be granted, and
to determine any limits on the access. For example, the CPU
resource manager decides whether the agent may run at all,
and if so, a limit on the total number of CPU seconds as well
on the rate (virtual-time CPU second per real-time second).
Once the decision has been made, it is the responsibility of
the agent run-time system to enforce the decision. In ad-
dition to its duties regarding access control, the manager
is responsible for setting and/or negotiating a price that it
charges for the resource, and for collecting funds from the
agent. So far we have used the price set by a human con-
figuring the resource managers. In Section 5 we describe
our experiments using auctions to allow the resource man-
agers to dynamically set prices based on supply, demand,
and “market conditions,” such as the prices it sees offered
by its “competitors.”
In D’Agents we use the Safe-Tcl [OLW97] infrastructure
to enforce the decisions of the resource managers [Gra96].
The Safe-Tcl kernel interpreter intercepts sensitive proce-
dure calls. On the first access, it asks the resource manager
for its decision; it caches the decision to avoid asking the re-
source manager on subsequent resource accesses. This archi-
tecture cleanly separates the mechanism (Safe Tcl) and the
policy (resource managers), allowing convenient substitution
of different policies, and allowing the resource managers to
remain independent of the programming language.
All of these mechanisms exist in early prototype form.
We plan more experiments to measure the performance of
the mechanisms, and more importantly, to design and im-
plement pricing policies within the resource managers.
The agents circulating in this environment have the op-
portunity to plan their activities based on the priorities pro-
vided by their originator (such as fastest completion time,
lowest price, most detailed information, and so forth), the
amount of currency they can spend, and the current price
of resources. An agent with a goal for fast completion time,
for example, may choose an algorithm that optimizes com-
putation time at the expense of memory usage; if the price
of memory is particularly high at this site, however, it may
choose to jump to an equivalent but cheaper site, or it may
choose an algorithm that uses less memory but runs longer.
4.6 Application: The Traveling Salesperson
We have developed a multi-agent application that uses the
banking system discussed in this paper for a traveling sales-
person scenario. The premise of the application is a travel-
ing salesperson that carries a laptop when visiting customers
and uses software that helps to select vendors and products,
prepare a quote, and place orders. Agents represent orders
and travel to the corporation’s computers where they inter-
act with billing, inventory, and shipping agents to arrange
for the purchase. Agents are also used to explore the vendor
catalogs and search for products that meet the customer’s
needs. In all cases, the agents are mobile and can function
while the salesperson’s laptop is disconnected [RGK97].
Figure 2 shows the structure of the application. The
traveling salesperson can gather information about a partic-
ular type of purchase by sending an agent to locate all the
vendors of the required type of product. The agents locate
vendors by interacting with a distributed system of yellow
pages, and bring back the most recent catalogs from the ven-
dors. The catalogs are displayed as an interactive window,
in which the salesperson can select items. The selected items
are packaged as an order agent. This agent travels to the
vendor locations and purchases the required items. This is
done by paying electronic cash, using the banking system
described in Section 4.2 and the arbiter protocol described
in Section 4.4. When the transaction is complete, the agent
returns to the salesperson’s computer with the purchased
items (sound clips in our prototype), which can be played
locally. If the transaction cannot be completed, the agent
returns to the salesperson to report on its status.
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Figure 2: The architecture of the salesperson application.
5 Dynamic Pricing
Resource manages can set the price of the resources they
control by using (a) fixed-pricing strategies provided at the
initialization of the system and possibly changed by the hu-
man users, or (b) by using dynamic pricing strategies that
allow them to adapt to the supply and demand in the sys-
tem. In this section we describe our work on dynamic pricing
and illustrate it with simulation results.
Dynamic pricing is important for several reasons. First,
we expect that it will be difficult to manually set prices that
lead to a stable, healthy agent economy. Second, the sys-
tem will change constantly, as resource supplies change (ma-
chines come and go) and resource demand changes (agents
come and go). Indeed, there will clearly be daily and weekly
cycles of activity: CPU time may be more expensive the mid-
dle of a workday than in the wee hours of Sunday morning.
In addition, our experience with the World Wide Web shows
that some resources are “hot” one day and not the next: e.g.,
a hurricane tends to make the weather-information servers
busier.
5.1 Market Models for Resource Control
There are four primary approaches to dynamic pricing.
Here, the seller is usually a resource manager, and the buyer
is usually an agent.
1. Seller-adjusted pricing: in this approach, the seller
monitors the demand for its services, adjusting the
price as demand fluctuates.
2. Negotiation: the seller and the buyer haggle over each
sale. This could be as simple as a double auction like
in the stock exchange.
3. Seller-driven auctions: auctions are feasible when there
are many buyers competing for the same item (re-
source), particularly when there are more buyers than
there are items.
4. Buyer-driven auctions: here, sellers broadcast their
prices, essentially bidding for buyers (for example,
[CMM97]).
In the following section we discuss our work on seller-driven
auctions.
5.2 Dynamic Pricing with Auctions
Auctions allow buyers to competitively set the price for
goods being sold, although the seller may have a reservation
price below which sale will not occur. By asking buyers for
prices, the seller needs no information about current market
demand and is able to capitalize on close to all of market
demand.
In this section, we explore the use of auctions as a pre-
liminary solution for resource control in a distributed agent
environment. We examine various properties of sealed-bid
second-price auction markets and their benefit to multi-
agent systems.
Several types of auctions can be considered to drive dy-
namic pricing in a distributed agent system. In the standard
English auction the seller openly announces a minimal price
for the good to be sold. Buyers then take turns publicly
submitting increasing bids or exiting the auction until only
one potential buyer remains. Strategically, the optimal so-
lution is for bidding to continue until the bidder willing to
pay the most over-bids her competitors and pays the value
of her closest competitor.
While English auctions are efficient in extracting buyer
values, they often take many rounds to complete and thus
can be inefficient for agents. Instead, we investigate the
sealed-bid second-price auction proposed by Vickery [Vic61].
The sealed-bid second-price auction is strategically identical
to the English auction but it requires only a single round of
bidding. Buyers privately submit their own valuations. The
winner is the competitor submitting the highest bid, though
the price of the good is the highest losing bid.
The best strategy for this type of auction is to submit a
bid equal to the value of the good. There is no incentive to
bid any lower; doing so only decreases the chance of victory
without any effect on the quality of a successful auction,
since the winner pays the loser’s bid. Bidding higher than
one’s value is dangerous and risks over-payment (a fate worse
than losing the auction.) Strategically, the English auction
is equivalent to the sealed-bid second-price auction.
One beneficial side effect of sealed-bid second-price auc-
tions is the near elimination of the revenue lost in some com-
petitive markets. Even in a competitive market (where there
are many sellers competing for buyers), a fixed price can
cause revenue to be lost in two ways: consumer surplus and
deadweight loss. Consumer surplus represents the loss of
revenue from buyers who pay less than they are potentially
willing to pay because the price is lower than their valuation.
When a higher price reduces the amount of product sold
so much that the total utility (the sum of consumer surplus
and revenue, the product of price and quantity) diminishes,
the loss is called deadweight loss. This normally does not
occur in competitive markets since equilibrium prices are
equal to costs. However, the resources sold computational
markets are, in the short term, produced regardless of de-
mand or cost, so any unsold amount can be considered a loss
to everyone, or deadweight loss. Auctions allow vendors to
sell a portion of inventories below cost to maximize revenue
intake.
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Figure 3: Simple supply and demand curves showing the
utility acquired by consumers and producers as well as the
loss incurred by setting a single price. The area denoted as
“Deadweight Loss” shows unsatisfied demand under the as-
sumption that adequate production exists to fulfill demand.
“Consumer Surplus” is the region showing how much more
customers would have been willing to pay.
Using a second-price auction to sell items leads to sales
at a variety of prices, since each auction sells to a different
buyer at potentially a different price. The price is close to
the actual value of the item, as determined by the buyer:
since a second-price auction forces buyers to pay an amount
close to their valuations, only the gap in bids between the
highest and second highest buyers is lost. (Given enough
competition, this gap is small.) This suggests that second-
price auctions lead to highly efficient markets in scenarios
where production quantities are an exogenous constant.
5.3 Modeling Auctions for Resource Allocation
To model and analyze the scope of sealed-bid second-price
auctions for resource control we have developed a model and
used simulation to evaluate it. In this model, many agents
we will call client agents request service from resource man-
agers we call server agents. All the servers sell a common
resource called the service. Prices in this model are fixed
with respect to quantity. Our model makes two assump-
tions. The first assumption is that the demand for the ser-
vice is perfectly elastic with respect to quantity. That is,
users are willing to pay the same price per unit regardless of
quantity. This assumption makes sense if the system is to
be used in an environment where all work presented to the
system must be completed. The second assumption is that
clients have enough electronic cash to complete their sched-
ule of requests, but are stingy; they derive some amount of
pleasure in conserving their currency pool.
Since prices are fixed with respect to quantity, the only
way to affect the price is through varying the quality of the
product. Goodness of service is measured by computing the
price/performance ratio. Performance, in this model, is cal-
culated as the time elapsed between the service request and
service completion, normalized for the quantity requested.
In this model, every client has an expectation of performance
with respect to per unit prices based on previous experiences.
A measure that connects price and quality of service al-
lows the clients to trade expenditure for performance, but
further specification is necessary for users to be able to evalu-
ate a good. In our model, clients have threshold for the level
of service for which they are willing to pay. This thresh-
old is described for every client as an isoquant curve in the
price performance space — a curve upon which every point
is equally desirable. Figure 4 shows an example of such a
threshold. The threshold is used by clients to determine
what is an acceptable price for a service request.
pr
ic
e
time
acceptable
unacceptable
Figure 4: A sample curve describing a client’s preference
regarding price and performance.
5.4 Analyzing the Model
To understand the possible effect of sealed-bid second-price
auctions on resource control in multi-agent systems, we com-
pute buyers’ mean waiting time to measure the distribution
of wealth in the market. For simplicity, we assume that
the request size is exponentially distributed and the request-
arrival rates follow a Poisson distribution. Also, the request
distributions are identical for all client agents; the distin-
guishing feature among agents is their priority of service
(relative spending).
Consider for simplicity the case of one server (resource
manager) and n clients (agents requesting the resource).
Suppose the mean service-size request is μ and it occurs
with mean frequency f . The expected wait time of the rich-
est client is simply the server utilization times μ since the
client willing to spend the most has only to wait for the user
currently being serviced to complete.
The rest of the clients’ expected waiting time is a bit
more complex to calculate. The following results holds:
Theorem 5.1 (Lower Bounds)In a sealed-bid second-
price auction where clients have approximately the same re-
quest patterns, the lower bound for waiting time of the client
that spends less than n other clients do is 1 − ρ′/(lnρ′)2,
where ρ′ is the utilization by the n clients that spend more.
Proof:
To simplify this exposition, suppose that clients spend
unique amounts with respect to each other. The analysis
can be extended for the general case as well.
The variables that affect a client’s waiting time are the
ordinality of the client’s spending compared to the competi-
tion (in other words, how many clients are willing to spend
more than the current client) and the expected time for the
server to service all clients with higher bids. It is possible to
derive the expected wait time for any particular client given
the expected time to service all the clients with higher bids.
The utilization of a M/M/1 queued server is just the
Poisson ratio function:
ρ = R(K, z) = 1−
zK
K!
K∑
j=0
zj
j!
(1)
[Tan95, p. 244] where K is the number of clients in the sys-
tem and z is the service ratio (the time taken between service
requests, divided by time taken up by service). So z is:
z =
1
fμ
(2)
Since the arrival times are randomly independently dis-
tributed, the chance that a client requests service when the
n clients with higher bids are idle is:
1−R(n, 1
fμ
) (3)
An approximation for the expected wait time for the nth
richest client follows by noting that the system is memoryless
and that the probability that the server will be able to serve
a client is the utilization. Integrating over time we get the
expected wait time: ∫ ∞
0
(1− ρ′)ρ′tt dt (4)
Where ρ′ = R(n− 1, z), is approximately the utilization
of the queue by the n − 1 clients with higher bids. This
computation ignores the possibility that there could be a
client with a lower bid being served at the time of arrival,
but it serves as a lower bound on expected wait time and
the approximation is more accurate for the poor and the rich
clients.
Equation 4 integrates to:[
1− ρ′
ln ρ′
et lnρ
′
(t− 1/ ln ρ′)
]∞
0
=
1− ρ′
(lnρ′)2
(5)
By substituting Equation 1 into Equation 5 for ρ′, we
obtain the expected wait time as a function of expenditure
rank, assuming that all clients have roughly the same request
patterns.
The resulting function for wait time ensures that the wait
times of poorer clients are severe in comparison to those
of the wealthy because, in the estimation, the consumption
of the poor have no effect on the rich. This suggests that
better division of the resource pool is necessary for a scalable
equitable market system.  
5.5 Simulation Results
To verify the result in Theorem 5.1 we built a simulation of
the sealed-bid second-price auction for one resource manager
server and eight client agents. The client agents have unique
preferences as assumed above. Given the spread in expected
wait times, modeling preferences in this manner is somewhat
tricky. In congested scenarios, the poorer clients are not able
to obtain service that for which they are willing to pay.
Congestion is an important issue for mobile agents. In-
tuitively, it is easy to observe that all agents using a given
service are affected by congestion at all levels of spending.
Rich client agents have to wait at most the current service
time of a poorer client plus the additional wait incurred by
wealthier clients arriving in that time, so the estimation still
serves as lower bound on expected wait time.
The simulation data illustrated in Figure 5 depict how
spending rank determines average wait time. The plots are
consistent with Theorem 5.1. We note that in this exper-
iment, the eighth client in the scenario experienced long
enough wait times that caused its evaluation of service to
fall negative, so it left the market after only a few transac-
tions.
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Figure 5: Plot of spending rank versus average actual and
estimated expected wait time with z = 9 and logarithmic
scale.
6 Discussion
It is interesting to consider the implications of a system in
which the agent currency is tied to legal currency (e.g., U.S.
Dollars). Indeed, it is almost inevitable. Consider an in-
dividual that buys an expensive and powerful workstation,
and hooks it into the global agent system. The hardware re-
sources of that workstation are assets that quickly earn the
individual agent currency. Thus, the legal currency spent
to purchase the workstation are translated into agent cur-
rency. The user may now spend the agent currency to send
agents out into the system. Or, perhaps the user can sell
the agent currency to another user, perhaps a user who has
only a minimal workstation and thus little potential to gain
currency, in exchange for legal currency. As a result, all of
the world’s computational resources are sharable! Individu-
als can decide whether to own and maintain a workstation
of their own, or to “rent” services from other machines.
The use of sealed-bid auctions is a simple first implemen-
tation of a market system. It is unclear whether auctions
provide sufficient incentive to balance load and to smooth
system-wide consumption; allowing users to set their own
prices gives little motivation to move given any consump-
tion.
This simple auction style overly favors the wealthy clients
and myopically attempts to maximize sales. We are cur-
rently exploring another market scheme allowing the seller
to rent out access rights to portions of a given resource to
the highest bidders. In this revised system, buyers submit
demand functions specifying the willingness to purchase the
resource at any given price. A buyer effectively rents the
right to access a share of the available resources until the
price rises beyond the buyer’s budget. A single price is max-
imized under the constraint to completely sell all currently
available resource shares.
We will implement these and perhaps other approaches
to experiment with their feasibility in the systems and appli-
cations that we envision. It is likely that a hybrid approach
will be necessary: for example, to use seller-adjusted pric-
ing when the competition is fairly light, but to switch to an
auction when the demand overwhelms the supply.
Needless to say, in a real system not all of the agents and
resource managers will use the same algorithm for negotia-
tion, bidding, or price setting. We are particularly interested
in the effects on an economy when different algorithms clash
with each other, or (in the worst case) when a malicious or
buggy agent or service uses an irrational algorithm.
Clearly, there is a tremendous amount of work neces-
sary to understand the policies and mechanisms necessary to
manage all of the resources in a complex, distributed, agent
system. We believe that the currency model has tremen-
dous potential, and that our experimental study will lead to
a deeper understanding of that potential as well as concrete
suggestions for implementation in a real system.
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